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NOWHERE TO GO: A REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
BASED APPROACH TO CLIMATE DISPLACEE
PROTECTION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
Evan M. FitzGerald* & Gregory G. Toth†
Abstract: An influx of climate-driven, cross-border migration has begun
in Southeast Asia, but these peoples are not considered refugees. They are at best
economic migrants, and at worse stateless persons. They are displaced because of
human-driven environmental decline, with limited protections due to the lack of an
internationally accepted definition of their status: there is no agreed upon definition
of what constitutes a person displaced by climate change. As such, there are no
legal frameworks that accurately speak to the realities of this growing problem.
Worse, there is limited understanding that the confluence of these omissions will
lead to disastrous effects and a humanitarian toll unlike anything the world has seen.
We propose a first step in addressing this challenge for Southeast Asian
states—a legally binding definition. We submit that a “climate displacee” is one
who is compelled to migrate due to the direct or related impact of changing climates.
We propose a second step in addition to this definition—a Southeast Asian state
regional climate migration framework that takes a human rights-based approach.
This approach, based on existing international legal frameworks, is the only way to
properly address the humanitarian challenges inherent to migration. We also
propose a series of fundamental and operational principles as building blocks for
such a regional framework. These principles consider human rights and address
shortfalls with other frameworks. Southeast Asian states have an opportunity to
develop the world’s first cross-border climate migration framework, and we have
drafted our recommendations to assist in that effort.
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“[A]ll migration governance measures should be implemented with full
respect for the human rights of the people concerned. They are no different—
and in no way less valuable or less deserving of dignity—than you or I.”—
Michelle Bachelet
INTRODUCTION
Between 200 million and one billion people will be displaced due to
environmentally-related pressures by 2050.1 Inhabitants of countries in the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (“ASEAN”)2 will face some of the
highest levels of exposure,3 including rapid-onset events such as cyclones and
floods, as well as slow-onset events such as sea level rise and drought.4 It is
no coincidence that ASEAN states, such as Vietnam and Cambodia with
agriculture and populations concentrated on coastal plains,5 are considered

1

Not all environmental causes are climate-induced; for example, chemical spillage or over-harvesting
can result in environmental damage. Mostafa Naser, Climate Change, Environmental Degradation, and
Mitigation: A Complex Nexus, 36 WM. & MARY ENV’T L. & POL’Y REV. 713, 747–48 (2012).
2
Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and
Vietnam.
3
DANG NGUYEN ANH ET AL., INT’L ORG. FOR MIGRATION [IOM], ASSESSING THE EVIDENCE:
MIGRATION, ENVIRONMENT AND CLIMATE CHANGE IN VIETNAM 3 (2016).
4
U.N. Econ. and Soc. Comm’n for Asia and the Pacific, The Disaster Riskscape Across Asia-Pacific:
Pathways for Resilience Inclusion and Empowerment, at 2, U.N. Doc. ST/ESCAP/2863, Sales No.
E.19.II.F.12 (2019).
5
See Colm Duffy et al., Drivers of Household and Agricultural Adaptation to Climate Change in
Vietnam, 13 CLIMATE AND DEV. 242, 243 (2020).
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both highly vulnerable6 and sensitive7 to the impacts of climate change.8 This
region’s low levels of adaptive capacity9 and economic stability10 will see an
increasing migration push11 as disasters intensify with projected temperature
increases.12
The internationally recognized protections that exist for peoples
compelled to migrate by war or politics13 do not extend to peoples displaced
by the impacts of climate change. 14 Some regional agreements, such as
Africa’s Kampala Convention and Latin America’s Brazil Declaration, have
experienced moderate success filling this void with elements therefrom being
incorporated into many of the signatories’ national laws. However, in practice
many of these same countries have emphasized repatriation over other
solutions respective of migrants’ human rights.15
The goal of this article is to offer a starting point for the discussion of a
regionally based human rights-based approach (“HRBA”) for the protection
of those in Southeast Asia pushed to migrate by the effects of climate change.
In Part I, we outline climate-induced issues and migration patterns in
Southeast Asia. In Part II, we examine the agreements applicable to these
6
“Vulnerability is the degree to which a system is susceptible to, or unable to cope with, adverse
effects of climate change, including climate variability and extremes. Vulnerability is a function of the
character, magnitude, and rate of climate change and variation to which a system is exposed, its sensitivity,
and its adaptive capacity.” WORKING GRP. II OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
CLIMATE CHANGE 2001: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY 6 (2001).
7
“Sensitivity is the degree that a system is affected, either adversely or beneficially, by climaterelated stimuli. Climate-related stimuli encompass all the elements of climate change, including mean climate
characteristics, climate variability, and the frequency and magnitude of extremes. The effect may be direct
(e.g., a change in crop yield in response to a change in the mean, range, or variability of temperature) or
indirect (e.g., damages caused by an increase in the frequency of coastal flooding due to sea-level rise).” Id.
8
See WORLD BANK GRP., TURN DOWN THE HEAT: CLIMATE EXTREMES, REGIONAL IMPACTS, AND
THE CASE FOR RESILIENCE 1–2 (2013).
9
Adaptive capacity is the ability of a system to adjust to climate change (including climate variability
and extremes) to moderate potential damages, to take advantage of opportunities, or to cope with the
consequences. See EMMA JAKKU & TIM LYNAM, WHAT IS ADAPTIVE CAPACITY, REPORT FOR THE SOUTH
EAST QUEENSLAND CLIMATE ADAPTION RESEARCH INITIATIVE 5 (2010).
10
Katrina Wyman, Responses to Climate Change, 37 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 167, 174–175 (2013).
11
Push factors are those that compel migration away from a certain area. Sumudu Atapattu, Climate
Change, Human Rights, and Forced Migration: Implications for International Law, 27 WIS. INT’L L. J. 607,
620–21 (2009); see also Naser, supra note 1, at 751.
12
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, SPECIAL REPORT 15: GLOBAL WARMING OF
1.5 ° C, SUMMARY FOR POLICY MAKERS 1, 7 (Valerie Masson-Delmotte, et al., eds., 2018).
13
See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137; Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees, Oct. 4, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267.
14
Roxana A. Mastor et al., Energy Justice and Climate-Refugees, 39 ENERGY L. J. 139, 154 (2018);
Jane Steffens, Climate Change Refugees in the Time of Sinking Islands, 52 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 727,
729–30 (2019).
15
INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, THE KAMPALA CONVENTION: KEY RECOMMENDATIONS TEN
YEARS ON 28 (2019); Liliana Lyra Jubilut & Andrea Cristina Godoy Zamur, Brazil’s Refugee Resettlement:
Power, Humanitarianism, and Regional Leadership, in REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT: POWER, POLITICS, AND
HUMANITARIAN GOVERNANCE 70, 85–86 (Adèle Garnier et al. eds., 2018).
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issues and those in comparable situations. In Part III, we offer foundational
and operational HRBA principles that should be included in a regional
migration framework. We start from the position that those displaced by
climate change, like all other persons, have the same rights and freedoms
detailed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”), such as
the rights to adequate standards of living and health. 16 Finally, we offer
recommendations for moving forward with a HRBA regional agreement to
provide climate displacement protections while balancing state interests.
I.

CLIMATE INDUCED MIGRATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
A.

Climate Related Migration

An estimated 24.9 million additional people were living apart from their
usual places of residence in 2019. 17 These “migrants” are categorized in
various ways,18 with primary distinctions being made along temporal lines, as
well as geographic and causal lines. The temporal categorization of migration
involves distinguishing between “temporary” and “permanent”
displacement.19 Temporary migration is based on state-of-mind, as it entails
leaving one’s nation with the intent to return.20 Intent is important because
migrants commonly experience displacement that exceeds the amount of time
they initially planned, blurring the line between migratory permanence and
impermanence.21
The geographic categorization of migrants appears straightforward, as
it primarily relies on whether an international border has been crossed but
becomes more difficult to recognize with the introduction of causal corollaries.
International migrants include those avoiding persecution (29.4 million
persons; 22 asylum seekers and refugees, collectively “refugees”), those
seeking certain financial or material improvements (164 million persons;
16
G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 25 (Dec. 10, 1948); Tiffany
Duong, Comment, When Islands Drown: The Plight of “Climate Change Refugees” and Recourse to
International Human Rights Law, 31 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1239, 1256–57 (2010).
17
INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT MONITORING CTR., GLOBAL REPORT ON INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT 2020
1 (2019), https://www.internal-displacement.org/global-report/grid2020/downloads/2020-IDMC-GRIDpart1.pdf.
18
It should be noted that these categorizations, like most, are oversimplified and not universal.
Definitions seem to differ by organization, complicating comparisons. John Anderson, The Adaptive Nature
of Human Categorization, 98 PSYCH. REV. 409, 410–411 (1991); Shanti Robertson, Status-making:
Rethinking migrant categorization, 55 J. OF SOCIO. 219, 220 (2019).
19
Id.
20
Naser, supra note 1, at 743–44.
21
Mastor et al., supra note 14, at 151.
22
See INT’L ORG. FOR MIGRATION, WORLD MIGRATION REPORT 2020 21 (2019).
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“economic migrants”), and domestic migrants that include those evading
adverse treatment, events, or the effects of either (50.8 million persons; 23
internally displaced persons, “IDPs”).24
While the categories of migrants are often blurred,25 “climate migration”
has a distinct definition:
The movement of a person or groups of persons who,
predominantly for reasons of sudden or progressive change in the
environment due to climate change, are obliged to leave their
habitual place of residence, or choose to do so, either temporarily
or permanently, within a State or across an international border.26
Based on the above definition, and that of “climate refugee” proposed by
Biermann and Boas as those who have left their homes due to sudden or
progressive changes in their natural environment related to the impacts of
climate change,27 we adopt the following definition of “climate displacee”:
An individual compelled to migrate either by an alteration in
their natural environment or an impact thereof traceable to
climate.
The definition of “climate displacee” is intentionally broad and
contains several important components. The inclusion of “impact thereof” is
intended to encapsulate the climate-caused financial difficulties that compel
economic migration, as well as the temporal aspect of movement. This is
important because these difficulties will soon be the primary driver of why
people leave their homes.28 The definition also applies regardless of whether
such peoples’ migration involves crossing an international border or shifts
from “temporary” to “permanent” when homelands fail to recover from
23

INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT MONITORING CTR., supra note 17, at 11–12.
Francesco Castelli, Drivers of migration: why do people move? 25 J. TRAVEL MED. 1, 6 (2018).
25
There are seldom singular or clear-cut causes for migration, as many of the factors are interrelated;
for example, a disaster can lead to economic hardship, which can lead to conflict, which can in turn lead to
disaster, and vice-versa, making it difficult to say definitively which factor or factors were ultimately
responsible. See NANSEN INITIATIVE, AGENDA FOR THE PROTECTION OF CROSS-BORDER DISPLACED PERSONS
IN THE CONTEXT OF CLIMATE CHANGE VOL. 118 (2015).
26
GLOSSARY ON MIGRATION, IOM (2019), https://www.iom.int/glossary-migration-2019.
27
Frank Biermann & Ingrid Boas, Preparing for a Warmer World: Towards a Global Governance
System to Protect Climate Change Refugees 1 (Global Governance Working Paper No. 33, Nov. 2007),
http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d0002952/Climate_refugees_global_governance_Nov2007.pdf.
28
NANSEN INITIATIVE, supra note 25, at 14–15 (2015).
24
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environmental degradation. 29 Further, it incorporates not only economic
migrants, 30 but also refugees and IDPs effected by climate impacts and
changes.31
The final reason our proposed definition is intentionally broad is that
the interrelation of climate change impacts and migration push are not fully
understood.32 While it is easy to see the causal connections between migration
and the sudden onset disasters that are magnified by climate change (e.g.,
floods, fires, and freezes), slow onset disasters can also create situations that
necessitate permanent migration.33 As such, attributing migration to a specific
cause for the sake of categorization is difficult. For example, in the ASEAN
context, 34 sea level rise is a slow onset event, which is amplified by the
frequency of typhoons and monsoons. 35 In turn, this increases the prevalence
and severity of flooding and landslides that leach soil nutrients, contaminate
ground/drinking water,36 and contribute to irreversible37 salinization of soil,38
negatively affecting agricultural production.39 When exacerbated by poverty,
the resultant loss in resources 40 can leave impacted populations with no
alternative but to move elsewhere to meet their bodily and financial needs.41
By this measure, several ASEAN members are at particular risk.42
29

Naser, supra note 1, at 744–45.
UNHCR Master Glossary of Terms, U.N. HIGH COMM’R ON REFUGEES,
https://www.unhcr.org/glossary/#e (select “E” and scroll to second term, “economic migrant”).
31
Atapattu, supra note 11, at 616; UNHCR Master Glossary of Terms, supra note 30 (definitions for
“climate refugee” and “person displaced in the context of disasters and climate change”); Julia Toscano,
Climate Change Displacement and Forced Migration: An International Crisis, 6 ARIZ. J. ENV’T. L. & POL’Y
457, 480 (2015).
32
Will Steffan et al., The Anthropocene: From Global Change to Planetary Stewardship, 40 AMBIO
739, 751–752 (2011).
33
NANSEN INITIATIVE, supra note 25, at 24.
34
Y. Hijioka et al., CLIMATE CHANGE 2014 IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY 1133, 1687
(V.R. Barros et al. eds., 2014).
35
Id. at 1334.
36
WORLD BANK GRP., supra note 8, at 78–79.
37
Mateugue Diack et al., Restoration of Degraded Lands Affected by Salinization Process under
Climate Change Conditions: Impacts on Food Security in the Senegal River Valley, in SUSTAINABLE
INTENSIFICATION TO ADVANCE FOOD SECURITY AND ENHANCE CLIMATE RESILIENCE IN AFRICA, SPRINGER
275, 277 (Rattan Lal et al. eds. 2019).
38
WORKING GRP. II OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE
2001: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY 49 (2001); see generally Joyce J. Chen & Valerie
Mueller, Coastal climate change, soil salinity and human migration in Bangladesh, 8 NATURE CLIMATE
CHANGE, 981–985 (2018).
39
Hijioka, supra note 34, at 1347,
40
See WORLD BANK GRP., supra note 8, at 109.
41
See id. at 110.
42
According to the Global Multidimensional Poverty Index, which measures global poverty by
looking at health, education, and standard of living. UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAM & OXFORD POVERTY
AND HUMAN DEV, INITIATIVE, GLOBAL MULTIDIMENSIONAL POVERTY INDEX 2019: ILLUMINATING
INEQUALITIES, 1–2 (2019).
30
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Southeast Asia Migration Flows

Migration and climate patterns make it possible to estimate some
ASEAN climate displacee movements. Vietnam and Cambodia provide
particularly useful insights in this regard.43 Both countries have experienced
extremely high rates of migration since the 1990s, and within each state are
large portions of the population, especially impoverished people, that remain
particularly vulnerable to natural disasters.44 When natural disasters occur in
Vietnam, government programs seek to assist affected groups by providing
temporary shelters close to the areas of origin.45 In theory, this allows people
to return home as soon as possible in the event of a natural disaster.46 However,
these programs face implementation challenges, such as Vietnam’s lack of a
migration-focused agency capable of efficient orchestration. 47 Further, not
everyone receives the intended benefits of these programs. This is due to the
Vietnamese government distinguishing between two categories of internal
migration: “organized” and “spontaneous.”48 Organized migration refers to
government-sponsored programs, while spontaneous migration refers to
movements occurring without governmental support.49
Approximately 90,000 Vietnamese people leave the country every year
to seek employment opportunities abroad.50 This is likely spontaneous, albeit
temporary, migration.51 Despite having a smaller population than Vietnam,
the number of Cambodian external migrants is even higher,52 with residents
of agricultural-focused villages often crossing borders in search of seasonal
work.53 As of 2011, 34,000 Cambodian migrants had migrated to the Republic
of Korea, 33,000 to Malaysia, and 750,000 to Thailand. 54 The exceptionally
high number of Cambodians entering Thailand were joined by over 91,000
refugees from Myanmar and over 550,000 stateless persons of various
ethnicities.55 This pattern is further complicated by the fact that Thailand does
43

See WORLD BANK GRP., supra note 8, at 95.
DANG NGUYEN ANH ET AL., supra note 3, at 39.
45
Id. at 27.
46
See id.
47
See id. at 58.
48
Id. at 16.
49
Id.
50
Id. at 47.
51
See id. at 16.
52
For example, in 2008, 3.6 million Cambodian citizens were classified as internal migrants. See G.
OUDRY, K. PAK, & C. CHEA, ASSESSING VULNERABILITIES AND RESPONSES TO ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE IN
CAMBODIA 22 (2016).
53
Id. at 50.
54
Id. at 12.
55
Thailand Fact Sheet January 2016, U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES (Jan. 2017).
44
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not have a national asylum framework. While the U.N. is helping the Thai
government with these and related challenges, more assistance is needed.56
Like Thailand, more developed ASEAN and East Asian countries are
typically the destinations of migration movements. In 2015, there were over
15,000 refugee applications filed in the Republic of Korea.57 Likewise, Japan
had a total of 7,586 refugee applications around the same time.58 These are
relatively small numbers, given the populations of Korea and Japan, 59 and
while they may be due to the host countries’ geographic isolation, they are
most likely due to strict asylum policies. For instance, Japan had 19,269
applications for recognition of refugee status in 2017, with only 20 legally
recognized as refugees.60 By comparison, there were over 179,000 refugees
and stateless persons in Malaysia during the same period despite the nation
having only 33 million people61 and no laws that provide the right to asylum.62
More than 155,000 of these refugees came from Myanmar, with the remainder
coming from nations such as Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, Syria, and Sri
Lanka.63
II.

MIGRATION LAW AND CLIMATE DISPLACEES
A.

International Agreements on Migration

There are no globally recognized legal protections for climate
displacees.64 This is due in part to there being no legally binding definition of
what constitutes a climate displacee, despite the existence of several

56

See id.
The Republic of Korea Factsheet, U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES (Feb. 2016),
https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/protection/operations/500019d59/republic-of-korea-fact-sheet.html.
58
Japan Fact Sheet, U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES (Feb. 2016), https://www.unhcr.org/enus/protection/operations/5000196c13/japan-fact-sheet.html.
59
See Population, Total - Korea, Rep., THE WORLD BANK GRP. (2019), https://data.worldbank.org/
indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=KR; see Population, Total - Japan, THE WORLD BANK GRP. (2019),
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=JP.
60
Press Release, Japan, Ministry of Justice, Immigration Bureau, Number of applicants recognized as
refugees in 2017 (Mar. 2018), http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:xxEdC9H6dXkJ:w
ww.moj.go.jp/content
/001255158.pdf+&cd=10&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us&client=firefox-b-d (Japan).
61
Population & Demography, DEP’T. OF STAT. MALAY. (2020), https://www.dosm.gov.my/v1/index.
php?r=column/ctwoByCat&parent_id=115&menu_id=L0pheU43NWJwRWVSZklWdzQ4TlhUUT09.
62
Figures at a Glance in Malaysia, U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, https://www.unhcr.org/enus/figures-at-a-glance-in-malaysia.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2022).
63
Id.
64
Mastor et al., supra note 14, at 154; Steffens, supra note 14, at 729–30.
57
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proposals. 65 Such proposals come from institutions such as the U.N.,66 the
European Parliament, 67 the Climate Institute, 68 the Nansen Initiative, 69 the
International Organization on Migration (“IOM”), 70 or from pre-existing
academic debate,71 but there has been no consensus within or between them
to date.72
The 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol (collectively, the
“Convention”) are the two foremost documents that define a refugee. 73
However, this definition provides only limited assistance to persons fearing
persecution who are unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin.74
The Convention was primarily designed to address issues that were present
immediately following World War II.75 It is limited in scope, and even taken
together with the 1967 Protocol, provides that only certain persons can be
refugees. 76 The Convention’s “legal definition” of refugee does not reflect
modern modalities, much less issues related to climate change.77 Though it is
possible to amend the Convention to include climate change as a driver of
migration—and thus qualify climate displacees as refugees—it is unlikely this
will happen.78 Nations typically avoid amending definitions within an existing
framework because it can impose additional requirements and reignite
interpretation debates.79
Legal protections for IDPs are similarly robust. The United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees (“UNHCR”) Guiding Principles on Internal
Displacement (“Guiding Principles”) provide for the needs of IDPs and ensure

65

Naser, supra note 1, at 757–58.
Atapattu, supra note 11, at 619–20; Steffens, supra note 14, at 757–58.
67
See Joanna Apap, The Concept of ‘climate refugee’—towards a possible definition, EUR. PARL.
RSCH. SERV., PE 621.893 (Feb. 2019).
68
Atapattu, supra note 11, at 620.
69
NANSEN INITIATIVE at 17, supra note 25, at 16–17.
70
See
Environmental
Migration
Portal—Environmental
Migration,
IOM
(2020),
https://environmentalmigration.iom.int/environmental-migration.
71
Naser, supra note 1, at 734; see Sodiqa Williams, Comment, Do What You Can Do, With What You
Have, Where You Are: Assessing the Plight of Climate Change Refugees and Approaches to Fill the Gaps
Within the International Legal Framework, 1 CHI-KENT J. ENV. ENERGY L. 103, 119 (2011).
72
Atapattu, supra note 11, at 620.
73
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 13; Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees, supra note 13.
74
See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 13, at 14.
75
Duong, supra note 16 at 1249–50.
76
See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 13; Protocol Relating to the Status
of Refugees, supra note 13.
77
Atapattu, supra note 11, at 624.
78
See Steffens, supra note 14 at 751–52.
79
See Stillings, infra note 221.
66
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that they have the same rights and freedoms of other persons in their nation.80
Moreover, the Guiding Principles intentionally frame the rights of IDPs as
consistent with human rights law.81 Central to this is the idea that nations are
responsible for the protection of populations in their own jurisdictions, putting
IDP concerns squarely within the ambit of national law;82 IDPs have the right
to request humanitarian assistance, and certain national authorities are
required to render such assistance.83 This is a logical conclusion, as IDPs can
have significant social, political, and economic impacts within their home
nations. 84 While the Guiding Principles do not explicitly mention climate
change or climate displacees, their universal nature makes up for this
deficiency.85 Like the UDHR, they affirm that all peoples have an inherent
right to life, liberty, and security.86
The challenges of refugees and IDPs are consistently recognized at the
international level. The 2016 New York Declaration for Refugees and
Migrants acknowledged the responsibilities placed on nations with IDPs,87
and the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, adopted
two years later, reaffirmed the importance of international cooperation along
with the certainty of state sovereignty. 88 Unlike the Convention and the
Guiding Principles, both of these documents recognize cross-border and
climate-induced migration,89 and point to the Nansen Initiative for Disaster
Induced Cross-Border Displacement as a future standard bearer (“Nansen
Initiative”). 90 The Nansen Initiative’s Agenda for the protection of crossborder displaced persons sheds light on cross-border movements, including
key drivers and the people that undertake them.91
To this end, the International Law Commission (“ILC”) has also
created draft articles that concern the protection of persons in the event of both
human-made and environmental disasters.92 Collectively, these instruments
supplement documents such as the Paris Agreement, which highlights the
80

U.N. Secretary-General, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2, introductory note (Feb. 11, 1998); Atapattu, supra note 11, at 617.
81
Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, supra note 80, annex.
82
Elizabeth Ferris, Climate Change, Migration, Law, and Global Governance, 44 N.C.J. INT’L L. &
COM. REG. 425, 433–34 (2019).
83
Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, supra note 80, at 6.
84
Toscano, supra note 31, at 467.
85
See Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, supra note 80.
86
Id. at 5–7.
87
G.A. Res. 71/1, at 1–2 (Oct. 3, 2016).
88
See G.A. Res. 73/195 (July 13, 2018).
89
G.A. Res. 71/1, supra note 87, at 10.
90
G.A. Res. 73/195, at 15 (July 13, 2018); NANSEN INITIATIVE, supra note 25, at 7.
91
See NANSEN INITIATIVE, supra note 25, at 15.
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importance of climate change in humanity’s future, 93 and the general
protections of human rights law. Unfortunately, neither the Nansen Initiative
nor the ILC’s recommendations are legally binding. Even when taken
collectively, all these positive steps suffer from shortcomings, such as critical
issues surrounding admission and the rights of displaced persons if
admitted—again leaving these concerns in the domain of more focused
approaches.94
B.

Regional Migration Frameworks

Regional frameworks offer an alternative solution to climate change
migration where international legal instruments have failed. These more
targeted solutions, such as Latin America’s Brazil Declaration and Africa’s
Kampala Convention, serve as models for future legal developments since
they are two of a limited number of such frameworks that concern regional
displacement.95
The Brazil Declaration (“Declaration”) is a 2014 UNHCR-sponsored
agreement, encompassing Latin America and the Caribbean, that targets the
elimination of statelessness and seeks to improve upon the Cartagena
Declaration on Refugees, a non-binding agreement between 10 Latin
American countries. 96 It acknowledges that humanitarian commitments to
refugees, stateless persons, and displacees are constantly evolving.97 It further
highlights the importance of a common legal framework to address the
protections of displaced persons, and recognizes that states have primary
responsibility for responding to humanitarian issues.98
The importance of taking a HRBA is a constant theme throughout the
Declaration. 99 This is evident in its recognition that climate change poses
challenges to all people in Latin America and that climate impacts may affect
displacement. 100 The Declaration calls for the creation of local integration
93
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See NANSEN INITIATIVE, supra note 25, at 8.
95
Sheila C. McAnaney, Comment, Sinking Islands? Formulating a Realistic Solution to Climate
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programs that support the inclusion of refugee policies and laws at the national
level. 101 It also creates an observatory that tracks displaced populations.102
However, the Declaration does not legally require nations to meet the needs
of climate displacees. 103 There are several references to the traditional
definition of refugees, but only passing mention to climate change-related
challenges.104 Without a clear definition of climate displacee, or the inclusion
of such persons within the traditional definition of refugee, the Declaration
does not provide the level of protection required for these populations.
Though the Declaration is a positive development, it does little more than
identify that the problem exists and highlight the need for additional studies.105
The Kampala Convention takes a different approach and provides
protection for African-based IDPs. 106 This regional framework begins by
defining an internally displaced person as:
. . . persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged
to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in
particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed
conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human
rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not
crossed an internationally recognized State border.107
The Kampala Convention articulates a legal framework that provides
for obligations and responsibilities of party states.108 Article 4 requires that
party states respect humanitarian and human rights laws in order to avoid the
arbitrary displacement of persons.109 Article 4 also calls for the creation of an
early-warning system to establish and implement disaster risk reduction
(“DRR”) strategies to protect and assist displacees.110 The system is designed
to protect against arbitrary displacement, including displacement from forced
evacuations due to natural or human-made disasters if such evacuations are
not required for safety and health purposes.111
101
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The Kampala Convention explicitly ensures a HRBA; this is vital to the
success of future migration frameworks because it provides necessary
protections where none may presently exist, especially in the case of climate
displacees. The early-warning system envisioned by the drafters of the
Kampala Convention goes one step further in ensuring these protections. The
ability to identify human rights violations before they occur is crucial; the
early-warning system makes sure that warning signs of potential violations
are caught.
Article 5 of the Kampala Convention highlights that it is the
responsibility of parties to the Convention to provide humanitarian assistance
for those displaced due to natural or human-made disasters. 112 And this
responsibility is reinforced by the parties’ duty to cooperate to protect
displacees.113 This requirement is potentially challenged by the provisions in
Article 10, however, which note that displacements can be legally induced by
large-scale development projects, pending an environmental impact
assessment.114 As climate change impacts become more prevalent and affect
more states of the African Union, these states may look to protect their own
interests and better harness available natural resources.115 Article 10 requires
that the states perform an environmental impact assessment; however, it is
unclear whether this assessment is multinational. This issue is unfolding in
relation to the damming of the Blue Nile by Ethiopia’s Grand Ethiopian
Renaissance Dam, which restricts the flow of water to Sudan and Egypt.116
This project has the potential to impact a huge number of people; the dam will
exacerbate droughts upriver, leading to the creation of displacees.117
The considerations of the Kampala Convention are important
considerations for an ASEAN migration framework. While some ASEAN
states may not share land-based borders, there are many that share both
borders and access to natural resources. Several ASEAN states also share river
systems, like the Mekong River, which is currently subject to damming in
several locations.118
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HUMAN RIGHTS AND CLIMATE DISPLACEES IN
SOUTHEAST ASIA
A.

Migration and Human Rights Vulnerability

A regional framework for climate displacee protection is needed in the
absence of state law. This is especially true for ASEAN states, as many do not
maintain adequate asylum or immigration procedures. A regional framework
will help to guide individual countries with the creation and implementation
of climate displacee laws at the national level to empower these states to meet
future demands. These laws need to consider not only a proposed regional
framework, but also preexisting global human rights conventions.
There are several global conventions that provide climate displacees
with some measure of protection despite few of these legal documents
specifically addressing climate issues. 119 The Convention provides basic
protections from certain types of persecution that may arise as a result of
climate displacement. 120 The International Covenant on Economic, Social,
and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”) extends protections that include a guarantee
of adequate food and housing, as well as the continuous improvement of living
conditions. 121 The International Convention on Civil and Political Rights
(“ICCPR”) provides a right to life and includes the right to freedom of
movement.122 All of these documents have enshrined the principle that human
rights law exists to protect society’s most vulnerable populations.123
Foremost amongst these is the UDHR, which protects the human
dignity of all persons.124 It is through this lens, specifically Article 3 (right to
life),125 Article 13 (right to movement),126 Article 14 (right to a standard of
living and health),127 and Article 25 (right to enjoy asylum),128 that we analyze
the asylum and immigration laws of ASEAN states, and whether destination
119
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states are suited to receive climate displacees. These countries include the
ASEAN states of Thailand and Malaysia as migration origin nations, and the
Republic of China, Japan, and Korea as migration destination nations.
1.

Thailand

Thailand has been a party to the ICCPR and ICESCR since 1996 and
1999, respectively.129 However, Thailand is not a party to the Convention,130
nor does it have any asylum laws. 131 Thailand’s immigration law, the
Immigration Act, classifies those without Thai nationality as “aliens,” 132
whereas “immigrants” are aliens that enter the country. 133 Aliens without
valid passports, or other documents used in lieu of passports, are denied entry
to Thailand.134 Aliens without the ability to make a living are likewise denied
entry, as are those with no money.135 However, aliens that are residents of
nations that border Thailand are allowed to make temporary trips into the
country without valid paperwork.136 There are also several other temporary
visitor categories that include business, scientific research or training
activities, amongst others.137
While Thailand demonstrated its commitment to human rights by
ratifying the ICCPR and ICESCR, it has not fully addressed its human rights
challenges as it has not ratified the Convention. 138 Likewise, Thailand
maintains no asylum act or law despite the large number of refugees and
stateless persons within its borders.139 While the U.N. can help alleviate the
pressures resultant of such persons’ presence in the short term with the
UNHCR’s assistance in providing coordination and resource mobilization,
reliance on the U.N. is not a long-term solution.140
Thailand’s immigration law does not meet the challenges posed by the
four articles from the UDHR. It does not allow for a standard of living and
129
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health, right to life (due to restricted entry), or asylum. However, Thailand’s
immigration law arguably does allow for some freedom of movement, at least
for citizens of bordering nations with the intent to stay temporarily. 141
Thailand’s other displaced persons law, its national screening mechanism,
provides a definition of a “protected person,” as one who is unable or
unwilling to return to their home nation owing to reasonable grounds that they
would suffer persecution as determined by the Committee.142 However, this
definition lacks clarity about what the Committee may determine to be
reasonable.143 An alien determined to be a protected person is afforded rights
under Clause 25, which provides for non-repatriation and that children will be
educated. 144 The national screening mechanism is an encouraging
development. However, it does not provide support to those who could
become climate displacees or comport with the four articles from the UDHR.
This is due to its nebulous definition of “protected person” and limited support
provided to those with such status.
Due to Thailand’s lack of an asylum framework and refugee law, it is
not prepared to receive climate displacees. If Thailand were to adopt a refugee
law or ratify the Convention then it may become a potential destination for
displaced persons, provided that the definition chosen for “refugee” reflects
that of climate displacee.
2.

Malaysia

Malaysia is not a party to the ICCPR, the ICESCR, 145 or the
Convention.146 Malaysia does not have an asylum law,147 but it does have an
immigration law. Section 6 of Malaysia’s Immigration Act of 1959/1963
provides the basic requirements for entry into the country for those other than
citizens.148 A valid entry permit is required for entry into Malaysia.149 Even
with an entry permit, a person that is unable to demonstrate that they have the
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means of supporting themselves and any dependents and are likely to become
“a pauper or charge of the public,” is considered a prohibited immigrant.150
Malaysia’s immigration laws do not reflect UDHR considerations. In
addition to not being a party to the three conventions noted above, its laws do
not provide a guaranteed right to life or right to a standard of living and
health. 151 There is also no freedom of movement, except perhaps through
repatriation.152 There is no right to asylum because no asylum laws exist in
Malaysia, leaving the responsibility for refugee issues to the U.N.153
Malaysia’s immigration law is not conducive to receiving climate
displacees. There is nothing in the text of its immigration law that alludes to
the challenges of those at risk from climate change, despite Malaysia being
both a destination and origin for climate displacees because of its location in
Southeast Asia. 154 Malaysia’s inability to cope with climate displacees is
further signaled by its lack of a dedicated asylum law and adherence to basic
human rights frameworks. This inability stands in contrast to potential
destination nations, which may have better developed refugee procedures and
coordination.
3.

The Republic of Korea (Korea)

Korea is party to both the ICCPR and ICESCR, having ratified them in
1990. It is also party to the Convention as of 1992.156 Korea’s Refugee Act
and Immigration Act both contain definitions of “refugee” and “foreigner,”
with the latter defined as “any person who is not a national of Korea.”157
Korea requires that all foreigners hold a valid passport and visa when
entering the country. 158 The same law allows foreigners who qualify as
refugees to stay for up to 90 days with the proper approvals. 159 Korea’s
Refugee Act defines “refugee” as a foreigner who is:
155
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member of a specific social group, or political opinion, or a
stateless foreigner who is unable or does not desire to return to
the nation in which he/she resided before entering the Republic
of Korea (hereinafter referred to as "nation of settlement") in
such fear.160
Article 1 of the Refugee Act makes explicit Korea’s Convention
adherence. 161 Refugees enjoy numerous benefits that include social
security, 162 guaranteed primary and secondary education for children, 163
temporary subsidization of living costs,164 and medical services.165
As signatories to the three human rights conventions, Korea’s
immigration and refugee laws adhere to the country’s legal obligations.
Through the lens of the UDHR articles, the right to life is recognized in Article
16-2 of the Immigration Act, which provides for the granting of temporary
landing permission if a foreigner fears for their lives. 166 The right to
movement is likewise adhered to through both the Refugee Act and the
Immigration Act, with Article 30 of the refugee act providing refugees the
same rights as those in the Convention.167 The right to health and a standard
of living of refugees are present in Articles 31 and 32 of the Refugee Act,
which provide for social security and basic livelihood security respectively.168
Though asylum is not specifically mentioned, Korea respects the right to
claim refugee status, and has specific procedures in place to determine
whether such status will be granted.169
However, Korea’s definition of a refugee is not broad enough to allow
for an interpretation that includes climate displacees.170 Its definition, likely
based on the definition of refugee from the Convention, reflects the document
on which it is based.171 Korea has not yet addressed climate displacees issues,
despite being a destination nation for migrant labor. Its laws are thus not
160
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currently conducive to receiving climate displacees, though this could change
with an amendment to its definition of “refugee.”
4.

Japan

Japan is a signatory to both the ICCPR and ICESCR and has obligated
itself to uphold the principles enshrined in those two frameworks since
1979.172 It has also been a party to the Convention since the 1980s.173 The
Convention is recognized in Japan’s Immigration Control and Refugee
Recognition Act (“Act”), which was last amended in 2016. 174 This act
provides for both immigration and asylum procedures in Japan, with the term
“foreign national” used to define a person who is not of Japanese
nationality.175
The Act states that all foreign nationals must have a passport to enter
Japan, and cannot be indigent (without a fixed dwelling place) or likely to
burden the government because of an inability to work.176 Japan has numerous
immigration categories, many of which can be applied if an employer
sponsors the applicant. 177 Japan permits the granting of temporary refuge
(asylum) to foreign nationals under the auspices of the Convention if they are
fleeing “a territory where their life, body, or physical freedom were
threatened.” 178 Granting this status permits refugees to gain long-term
residency status, but they must enter Japan from a territory where they would
be persecuted according to the Convention’s definition.179
As a signatory of numerous human rights conventions, it is no surprise
that Japan’s Act adheres to UDHR principles. The Act provides immigrants
with a right to life, freedom of movement, and the right to a standard of living
and health—provided they meet several standard criteria. 180 These
considerations are noted in the Act’s Article 17, which allows for permission
for emergency medical care, and Article 18-2, which permits landing for
temporary refuge. 181 Immigrants normally must have a passport and valid
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employment to stay in Japan.182 This is arguably not difficult to accomplish,
because there are many immigration categories available. Provided that such
procedural requirements are met, Japan’s Act adheres to the three relevant
articles of the UDHR. Asylum in Japan is an option for those who do not meet
the requirements for migrant work. Japan has adopted the universally
recognized definition of “refugee” and placed it at the beginning of the Act.183
This definition allows for the right to enjoy asylum under the UDHR and the
refugee convention, though its application is limited.
The Act does not note climate displacees. 184 This is because the
internationally recognized definition of “refugee” has not changed in more
than half a century.185 Japan’s definition of a refugee as a person fleeing from
“a territory where their life, body, or physical freedom are threatened,”
however, could be broadly interpreted to include climate displacees. 186
Interpreting Japanese asylum law in this way allows for people from ASEAN
states fleeing climate change to request asylum in Japan. However, Japanese
asylum practices result in only .001% of applicants being granted refugee
status. 187 Due to these limitations, the Japanese Act cannot be considered
conducive for receiving climate displacees.
5.

The Republic of China (Taiwan)

Taiwan recently adopted both the ICCPR and ICESCR on the same day
in 2009.188 However, Taiwan is not a party to the Convention.189 Taiwan does
not have asylum laws, nor does it make publicly available data on the number
of refugees that have applied for asylum.190 Taiwan’s immigration law uses
the term “alien” for those who are not “nationals,”191 but its immigration act
does not explicitly define the term “alien.”192
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Several articles note temporary and permanent alien immigration into
Taiwan. Article 16 specifically speaks to non-resident persons looking to
obtain residency in Taiwan.193 It allows for non-resident nationals who are
residing in Taiwan due to special circumstances in their home countries to
apply for residency and citizenship.194 It mentions that stateless persons and
non-citizens that entered Taiwan before the immigration act are allowed to
stay in Taiwan without fear of repatriation if they came from Thailand,
Myanmar, or Indonesia.195 Taiwan requires all new entrants to Taiwan to have
a passport, and the government prohibits entry by those without the proper
paperwork or ability to make a living in the country.196
Taiwan’s immigration law cannot be said to adhere to UDHR principles,
because Taiwan remains unsigned to the Convention and its immigration law
does not explicitly provide a right to life, standard of living and health, or
movement.197 Accordingly, Taiwan has not met the standards established in
Article 25 of the UDHR, because the country does not have any laws that
address the issue of asylum.198 Though Taiwan’s immigration law mentions
allowing people from certain nations to stay, these permissions are only
granted for those in the country before the law was passed. 199 Migrants
attempting to enter Taiwan are required to have a passport, 200 and if they
desire to stay, they must have a way to earn a living.201
Taiwan is unlikely to include climate change concerns in updates to its
immigration laws because it is not a party to the noted human rights
conventions. None of the relevant definitions’ elements, including those of
climate displacees, are addressed by Taiwanese migration law. If a climate
crisis were to suddenly occur, Taiwan may begin to accept refugees, but its
current policy has not signaled potential acceptance.
The absence of dedicated asylum laws that comply with the UDHR
from the two surveyed ASEAN states (Thailand and Malaysia; Table 1) is
troubling. What is more concerning, however, is that although two of the three
destination states (Korea and Japan) maintain UDHR-compliant asylum and
immigration laws, it likely will be difficult for climate displacees to find
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refuge in these states. Furthermore, none of the countries surveyed provide
protections for climate displacees.
Table 1: Origin and Destination States Human Rights Adherence
State
Thailand
Malaysia
Korea
Japan
Taiwan

ASEAN

Origin

Destination

The
Convention

ICCPR

ICESCR

Asylum
Law

Imm.
Law

Yes
Yes
No
No
No

Yes
Yes
No
No
No

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

No
No
Yes
Yes
No

Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes

No
No
Yes
Yes
No

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

UDHR
Compliant
Laws
No
No
Yes
Yes
No

Until there is a new definition of refugee, or a regional framework that
is adopted by ASEAN and properly considers climate displacees, it will be
difficult for climate displacees to find refuge in most destination countries.
This poses a significant problem for ASEAN states as it appears that both
developing and developed states are not willing to accept climate displacees.
Exactly where these climate displacees will go is a matter of concern,
reinforcing the need for an ASEAN framework on climate migration.
B.

Human Rights as a Basis for a Southeast Asia Migration
Agreement

In light of predictions that a sea level rise of just two meters will
displace nearly 180 million people, the majority in Southeast Asia, there is a
need for a framework to support climate displacees in the ASEAN region.202
It is unlikely that the current internationally accepted definition of refugee will
change before climate pressures become too great. Indeed, trying to change
an entrenched international instrument may be untenable. 203 However, the
vacuum created by such an infeasibility and the lack of individualized asylum
procedures among the surveyed ASEAN states could be filled through the
development of a regional climate displacee framework.
Though no such framework exists as of 2022, there are precedents in
other parts of the world. The Kampala Convention provides protection within
African nations for “persons or groups of persons who have been forced [. . .]
202
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to avoid the effects of [. . .] natural or human-made disasters.”204 This regional
framework definition directly addresses the possibility that migration may be
caused by climate change. Despite being limited to IDPs, it is a worthwhile
model to consider when developing a regional framework for ASEAN states.
This is especially so as the Kampala Convention is the only binding regional
framework that recognizes that climate change can spur migration.
However, identifying the need and a logistical precedent upon which to
model a response are only the initial steps; climate displacees should be able
to enjoy the same rights and freedoms under both international and domestic
laws as those who have not been displaced. 205 To this end, adopting a
framework that maintains a HRBA is essential to ensuring the protection of
climate displacees.
An ASEAN-based legal instrument for climate displacees requires the
alignment of moral and ethical considerations from states with complex
histories and divergent cultural backgrounds; its creation from scratch will be
fraught with difficulties. However, basing such an instrument on
internationally and regionally accepted legal precedents, such as human rights
law, may help reduce frictions.206 The tools and monitoring requirements for
human rights abuses already exist, and a HRBA will remove some of the
ability for compromise between the states (given the unwavering nature of
human rights). 207 Moreover, the alignment of any potential regional
framework with the UDHR must be accompanied by a recognition of the
reality that human rights and environmental issues are often intertwined.208
This recognition must also come with a willingness by origin and destination
states of climate displacees to consider the challenges of those least able to
help themselves.209
The first step in this alignment is inclusion of the right to life, which
guarantees (by requiring governments to protect) the life and liberty of each
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person.210 As discussed in Part I.A., climate change has the ability to deprive
people of life, making these articles of central importance.211 When migration
is the only option available, it is essential that climate displacees are secure in
the knowledge that they will not lose their lives because they lacked
choices.212
The right to a standard of living adequate for health (UDHR Art. 25;213
ICESCR Art. 11;214 ICRMW Art. 43215) is of equal importance because of
how climate change can affect human health and employment security. 216
Climate displacees will be forced to leave their countries and jobs because of
preexisting or potential harm to their and their families’ health.217
Another important right is freedom of movement (UDHR Art. 13;218
ICCPR Art. 12;219 ICRMW Arts. 5, 8, 39;220 Banjul Charter Art. 12221), which
guarantees that every person has the right to leave, and return to, their country.
This is important, because climate displacees are forced to leave their homes
temporarily or permanently, and for a right to leave one place to have any
meaning, a right to arrive to another is required.222
The right to asylum (UDHR Art. 25) 223 is perhaps the most obvious
requirement of a climate displacee framework. Climate displacees will need
to access asylum procedures in destination nations without the fear of
repatriation. Similarly, the rights to social security (UDHR Art. 22; 224
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ICRMW Arts. 27, 61225) and social and international order (UDHR Art. 28226)
demand international cooperation to ensure the “economic, social and cultural”
aspects of human dignity and the remainder of UDHR rights. This is
imperative in the case of climate displacees given their compulsory
assimilation into the host society, wherein they are unlikely to have adequate
economic opportunities and cultural networks, including representation for
ensuring they enjoy certain nation-based rights.
Despite the well-recognized importance of such rights, there are serious
challenges in creating a HRBA framework. Requiring that states abide by
additional legal obligations may stretch already tight resources. 227 These
constraints will continue to grow with the costs of adapting to and mitigating
climate change; and while some may view this as providing further incentives
for a sooner rather than later approach, others may feel that the high costs
have made this unfeasible.228 As such, even though nations may want to help
provide for climate displacees, these challenges may leave nations in an
untenable position and may even cause them to suspend their adherence to
human rights obligations.229 This issue becomes more problematic as certain
human rights claims may only arise after violations occur, 230 and such
violations may require that states take action to provide relief within and
outside of their borders.231 This may result in states experiencing monetary
hardships through the payment of ongoing legal fees, solatia, and other forms
of compensation.
An ASEAN-aligned migration framework should have three purposes
in recognition of such difficulties. The first is to develop a legal instrument
that recognizes that migration spurred by climate change is already occurring.
Although this will take time (the Kampala Convention took three years before
it entered into force),232 it will ensure that this issue is taken seriously and will
set the stage for future developments. The second is to ensure a common
understanding of how human rights apply in the context of climate
displacement. This requires countries to commit to human rights principles
and to adopt a regional consensus that human rights matter. An ASEAN
conception of what human rights entail may be different than an American or
European conception, but the bare minimum of adherence to the UDHR is
225
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227
228
229
230
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vital.233 The third purpose is to generate a set of foundational and operational
principles that can be included in a regional framework for adoption at the
national level. An ASEAN-aligned climate displacee framework would
necessarily bind ASEAN states, but each country will likely desire carve-outs.
Developing foundational and operational principles can allow for both a
regionally aligned framework that is vague enough for regional ratification,
while also providing guidance for the required development of national laws
if none exist. While such principles do not guarantee that every ASEAN state
will have the same climate displacee laws, the existence of a regionally
aligned framework can ensure that these laws are similar enough to be
effective at addressing climate change migration.
This article proposes a set of five foundational principles and four
operational principles that the drafters of an ASEAN-aligned climate
displacee framework should consider implementing. These principles provide
model language based on existing international legal instruments and were
developed to reflect the need for a HRBA and the realities of current and
anticipated migration-related issues.
C.

Foundational Principles

Most legal instruments contain a preamble that sets forth the purpose
of the document. This preamble is often followed by foundational principles
that set the tone for the remainder of the instrument and include broad
provisions that confirm both the need for the framework and adherence to
other frameworks. An ASEAN HRBA climate migration framework should
be no different. Luckily, there are numerous existing frameworks that can
provide model language for these foundational principles, ensuring that the
human rights of climate displacees are protected.
1.

Foundational Principle 1: Reaffirm the Importance of
Human Rights

The UDHR provides for a right to life, a right to movement, a right to
a standard of living and health, and a right to enjoy asylum.234 The ASEAN
233
The Asian view of human rights may differ from that of other regions, such as Europe, due to not
having witnessed “homogenized culture or tradition” that encompasses the entirety of the region and results
in a diminished role of law. Sienho Yee, The Role of Law in the Formation of Regional Perspectives in
Human Rights and Regional Systems for the Protection of Human Rights: The European and Asian Models
as Illustrations, in 8 SINGAPORE YEAR BOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CONTRIBUTORS 157, 161 (2004).
234
G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, supra note 16, arts. 13, 14, & 25.
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Human Rights Declaration should affirm these rights, establish them as
universal and indivisible, and state that ASEAN member-states should adopt
programs that include environmental protection and sustainability.235
Having a foundational principle that notes the importance of human
rights is imperative when considering climate displacees. However, for this
foundational principle to be effective in addressing climate issues, it must go
beyond stating human rights “guarantees.” This article proposes that an
ASEAN climate migration framework include the following language:
Recognizing that both natural and human-induced environmental
issues increasingly affect the lives and well-being of peoples
throughout the world, and in particular Southeast Asia, we
reaffirm our commitment to the universal and indivisible human
rights of all people as stated in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration.
This foundational principle sets the stage for the remainder of an
ASEAN climate migration framework. It highlights adherence to customs and
norms of both the international and regional communities, with the latter
recognizing that climate change is not only a reality, but that it also impacts
human rights. An important part of this statement is its allusion to how
ASEAN states will find it increasingly difficult to respect these rights in light
of expected climate-compelled migration.
2.

Foundational Principle 2: Good Faith

Good faith is vital to creating a successful framework. Parties to an
ASEAN climate migration framework must agree to act in good faith and
abide by the terms of the agreement. Good faith means “the honesty or
lawfulness of purpose.”236 This principle is often found at the beginning of
agreements, such as in the ICCPR. Article 2 of the ICCPR calls on each party
state to take the necessary steps to adopt laws or other measures necessary to
give effect to the rights enshrined in the agreement. 237 This good faith
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provision clarifies the scope of states’ legal requirements when they sign an
agreement.238
The basis for this internationally recognized idea of good faith is found
in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.239 This article
requires that a treaty be interpreted in good faith and in accordance with its
ordinary meaning. 240 We propose that an ASEAN climate migration
framework include the following language to address good faith:
We interpret the following provisions in good faith based on the
plain meaning of the words and will adopt or change any and all
national laws necessary to comport, and enforce alignment with,
this agreement.
This language accomplishes several goals. It reaffirms the importance
of interpreting the language of the agreement plainly and in good faith. It also
requires that parties either adopt or modify their own national laws to meet
the requirements set forth in the agreement. Lastly, it provides an enforcement
requirement that aims to ensure compliance. This may be the most challenging
sentence to include in an agreement as it creates an obligation amongst the
states to enforce the laws. In the eyes of some, this may potentially deprive
the state of sovereignty (if they choose to ignore their choice in accession and
right to rescind). This concern must be resolved at the national level, as mass
migration can only be properly addressed through the unanimous agreement
of all regional states to abide by the rules.
3.

Foundational Principle 3: Capacity Building

Capacity building involves building developing states’ ability to deal
with the challenges of climate change.241 It is an essential consideration in a
climate migration framework due to the differences in migration between
origin states and destination states, as destination states may have greater
capacity to receive displacees. The United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change notes that capacity building needs to be state driven. 242
238

Hum. Rts. Comm., General Comment No. 31 [80], The Nature of the General Legal Obligation
Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, U.N. Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (May 26, 2004).
239
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Jan. 27, 1980, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, art. 31.
240
Id.
241
Building Capacity in the UNFCCC Process, U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
https://unfccc.int/topics/capacity-building/the-big-picture/capacity-in-the-unfccc-process (last visited Feb. 1,
2022).
242
Id.

WINTER 2022

NOWHERE TO GO

241

Capacity building also should not attempt to reinvent the wheel but should
build upon what currently exists in the laws of each state.243 The core concepts
of capacity building highlight the implementation of actions in an effective
and systematic manner, learning by doing, and engagement in a continuous
process driven by improvement.244
While capacity building is not designed to spread resources amongst
different nations, it exists to develop each state’s abilities to react to migration
challenges. Capacity building is especially important in the ASEAN context.
The existing economic disparity amongst ASEAN states and potential
destination states is great, as exemplified by the differences in GDP between
Korea and Thailand.245 Building capacity amongst ASEAN states will help
them to prevent one state, and its peoples, from being without the ability to
recover. We propose that an ASEAN climate migration framework include
the following language to address capacity building:
We will develop and continually enhance laws to improve
migration capacity, implement these modifications in an
effective manner, and should a difficulty arise, seek support from
and provide support to other member-states.
This language accomplishes several goals. It reaffirms the need for
states to implement the laws created by an ASEAN climate migration
framework and requires that these states do so effectively. It also calls for
information sharing, as it gives states an option to report both their successes
and failures, so the process of implementation can be refined through the
exchange of states’ experiences. An excellent accompaniment to this principle
would be to provide a standardized mechanism for such knowledge sharing
within the agreement.246
4.

Foundational Principle 4: Disaster Risk Reduction

ASEAN states must attempt to limit the damage caused by climateenhanced disasters. Without such efforts, the number of climate displacees
will exceed current expectations as disasters increase in intensity and duration.
243
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Building resilience, reducing hazard exposure, and providing for response and
recovery are necessary to reduce the impact on both short-term and long-term
displacees.247
The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction provides priorities
for actions to reduce these impacts. This framework lists four priorities: (1)
the importance of understanding disaster risk; (2) strengthening disaster risk
governance to manage disaster risks; (3) investing in disaster risk reduction to
enhance resilience; and (4) enhancing disaster preparedness for supporting
effective disaster response and improving recovery, rehabilitation, and
construction.248 If applied at the regional and national levels, these priorities
may help to reduce the number of climate displacees due to the presence of
robust state-oriented resiliency programs. We propose that an ASEAN climate
migration framework include the following language to address disaster risk
reduction:
We recognize the importance of implementing efforts to reduce
the risk of disasters in limiting the number of climate displacees
and will abide by the tenants of the Sendai Framework for
Disaster Risk Reduction and any subsequent global frameworks
for disaster risk reduction, as well as share relevant
methodologies and information, so as to facilitate proactive
preparation for and the reduction of the impacts of natural and
human-enhanced disasters at the national level.
This language accomplishes several goals, the foremost being the
recognition of the importance of disaster risk reduction. The Sendai
Framework also provides an ideal starting point for developing framework
language on this topic. However, the most meaningful aspect of this language
is the explicit requirement that states take proactive steps to limit the number
of climate displacees and to prepare for disasters. This proactive approach
requires that countries act quickly based on the best available knowledge,
rather than waiting for disasters to occur. This is especially important for
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ASEAN states due to the increasing frequency of climate-enhanced disasters
in the region.249
5.

Foundational Principle 5: Financial Reality

The costs of providing for displaced persons are high. The UNHCR
noted that in 2018 the funding gap for global displacement continued to widen
to $4.5 billion USD.250 This figure relates to more than 71.4 million people of
concern (including refugees, IDPs, returnees, and stateless persons from a
variety of geographic locations).251 This quantity pales in comparison to the
nearly 180 million persons that will soon be displaced by environmentally
related pressures.252 A financial element must be embedded within an ASEAN
climate migration framework to address this issue or else such a framework
will not fulfill its purpose.
Unfortunately, no dedicated financial resources are available to address
migration issues outside of those provided by organizations such as the
UNHCR. A dedicated funding source is needed for ASEAN states given the
scope of the potential humanitarian fallout that massive climate displacement
will cause. An ASEAN climate migration framework is an ideal instrument
for the development of such a migration-focused financial resource. We
propose that an ASEAN climate migration framework include the following
language to address the financial component of climate migration:
In recognition of the incalculable value of human life and the
financial costs in supporting that life, we agree to support the
development of a regional funding resource for climate displacee
support.
This language does not accomplish as much as other principles, but it
serves an important purpose. It first highlights a HRBA by underlining the
value of every human life. It continues by recognizing the importance of
establishing a regional funding resource for climate displacees. However, it
249
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does not establish a regional funding resource. Instead, it aims to support the
development of a regional funding resource that will be agreeable to the states.
This approach recognizes the high cost of supporting refugees, IDPs, and
other displacees, and the reality that there are limited funding resources
currently available and varying degrees of political will regarding this issue.
These five foundational principles affirm the importance of a HRBA to
an ASEAN climate migration framework and underscore select principles
whose incorporation is vital to the success of any migration framework. These
foundational principles set the stage for operational principles that adopt
important legal and awareness considerations.
D.

Operational Principles

Operational principles for a climate migration framework reflect the
reality that many regional and international agreements lack enforceability.
This lack of enforceability is often based on the lack of recourse for issues
that arise relating to the agreement, which can result in obligations not being
met and agreements losing their utility. Relying on fundamental principles
alone can generate a lack of enforceability, so operational principles based on
the fundamental principles are required. We propose two initial operational
principles to reduce the possibility of these problems occurring: (1) defining
a climate displacee and (2) creating a legal oversight framework. We propose
a third operational principle that serves to track climate displacees to ensure
financial and humanitarian support is properly distributed. Lastly, we propose
a fourth operational principle that requires countries to cooperate and consider
the multinational impacts of private and public developmental actions.
1.

Operational Principle 1: Defining a Climate Displacee

The definition of a climate displacee is an essential part of any climate
migration framework. This definition needs to be broad enough to apply to
those affected by both natural and human-enhanced disasters, while also
recognizing that those experiencing the second- and third-order effects from
these disasters are also considered. This definition is necessarily located
towards the beginning of a climate migration framework and sets the stage for
the remainder of the agreement. As stated previously, we propose that an
ASEAN climate migration framework include the following definition of
climate displacee:

WINTER 2022

NOWHERE TO GO

245

A climate displacee is an individual compelled to migrate either
by an alteration in their natural environment or an impact thereof
traceable to climate.
This definition should be used exclusively in a climate migration
framework to avoid any confusion associated with other proposed definitions.
It is intentionally broad enough to fully encompass all those who may become
climate displacees in the ASEAN region.
2.

Operational Principle 2: Legal Oversight

Frameworks that lack enforceability provisions run the risk of
becoming unenforceable. A climate migration framework for ASEAN states
should include at least one provision that ensures that there is regional legal
recourse for both states and climate displacees when issues arise. This legal
recourse could come in several different forms, including an administrative
oversight body that hears administrative requests, a regionally aligned human
rights court,253 or the recognition of a pre-existing court, such as the European
Court of Human Rights.
An administrative oversight body grants states and climate displacees
the ability to address migration issues after climate-enhanced disasters. It can
also provide a forum for disputes between member-states, which can be
particularly valuable for disputes between origin and destination states. Such
an administrative oversight body could also convene special meetings to
consider the terms of an ASEAN climate migration framework and act as the
administrative arm of the overall framework.
Creating an administrative oversight body is an ideal first step in
generating legal oversight due to its ability to address this broad range of
issues. We propose that an ASEAN climate migration framework include the
creation of an administrative oversight body as follows:
Recognizing the importance of a forum for addressing grievances
generated under the terms of this framework, we agree to found
and fund an administrative body that provides an oversight
function. This administrative body will be responsible for
hearing administrative matters between climate displacees and
member-states, and administrative disputes arising between the
member-states. This administrative body will continue this
253
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function until a permanent ASEAN Court of Human Rights is
established, or such authority is acceded to a different legal body.
In addition to providing legal recourse, this administrative body
will maintain the authority to convene special meetings of the
member-states to consider changes, modifications, issues, and
updates proposed regarding the framework.
This language accomplishes several goals. It ensures that an
administrative body that provides oversight functions are both founded and
funded. It labels its primary function as that of hearing administrative matters
brought before it by two major groups. However, it also recognizes that such
an administrative oversight body is a stop-gap until a means of permanent
legal recourse is developed or a different legal body assumes the role as a
court of competent jurisdiction. This puts the final sentence into perspective,
as an oversight body should not be expected to adjudicate legal matters for an
extended period of time but should instead focus on improving and modifying
the framework as needed.
At the time of this writing, few regional courts dedicated to human
rights issues exist. The most well-known of these is likely the European Court
of Human Rights. An ASEAN climate migration framework should create a
similar court to adjudicate human rights issues, including regional climate
migration issues. We propose that an ASEAN climate migration framework
include the creation of a regionally aligned human rights court:
We further agree to develop and institute an ASEAN Court of
Human Rights that will, in addition to hearing general human
rights issues, adjudicate issues related to climate migration that
occur under this framework.
This language provides for the creation of a regionally aligned court to
address all human rights issues, including those related to climate migration.
This type of court is ideal given the proposed HRBA basis for the ASEAN
migration framework. This court could take several forms but would likely
consist of both a court of first impression and an appellate court. In addition
to considering purely legal issues, it could issue advisory opinions similar to
the International Court of Justice (ICJ). If member-states find this language
unacceptable, then an ASEAN climate migration framework could instead
cede legal review authority to a different legal body such as the ICJ, provided
the designated legal body accepts jurisdiction.
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Operational Principle 3: Tracking Displacement

Tracking migratory patterns is nothing new (see Section I.B). We have
been tracking human and animal movements for centuries because the data
derived from these activities is valuable. The IOM tracks the migration of
people in ASEAN states fairly regularly.254 An ASEAN climate migration
framework should expand this capacity, because IOM’s capacity may be
overwhelmed by the scale of climate change-related human migration in the
ASEAN region. ASEAN states should work in partnership with the IOM and
similar organizations to develop their own capacity for tracking climate
displacees throughout the region. This tracking will help focus relief efforts
and guide future projects. We propose that an ASEAN climate migration
framework include the capacity to track climate displacees through the
following language:
We agree to develop and implement comprehensive climate
migration tracking measures and processes in an effort to support
and expand upon the tracking practices of other international and
national actors.
This language provides for the creation of climate migration tracking
measures and procedures but does not state what exact efforts must be taken.
This will allow for the development of flexible solutions, rather than imposing
specific methods of data collection and information sharing. Additionally, this
language notes that other parties already are engaging in migration tracking
and that an ASEAN migration tracking system should seek to support these
existing efforts.
4.

Operational Principle 4: Cooperation and Multinational
Environmental Impact Assessments

Cooperation between member-states is essential to a successful
framework. This need for cooperation is fundamental in multilateral
agreements as identified by Article 5 of the Kampala Convention. The second
clause of this article calls on member-states to provide IDP-related assistance
to one another.255 Article 10 of the Kampala Convention calls for parties to
carry out socioeconomic and environmental impact assessments of proposed
254
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development projects prior to starting a project.256 Challenges will likely arise
amongst member-states that are required to cooperate with one another while
simultaneously being held responsible for the impacts of development
activities.
This tension highlights one of the shortcomings of the Kampala
Convention. Article 10 does not specify the nature of the required
environmental impact assessment. If this assessment is conducted at the
national level, then other member-states’ concerns may not be considered,
despite potentially sharing the same resources. If such an assessment is
conducted at a multi-state level, then it may cause significant project
development delays due to disagreements with the assessment process and the
interpretation of its outcome. It may also cause states to raise sovereignty
concerns, because multinational-level environmental impact assessments may
limit nation-specific development and the use of resources.
We propose that an ASEAN climate migration framework account for
these issues and require that states cooperate when developing environmental
impact assessments through the following language:
We recognize that cooperation is essential to the success of any
multilateral framework, and all states agree to cooperate with one
another regarding the issues and challenges identified by this
framework. All member-states also recognize the importance of
internal and multi-state development, and how these
developments impact the natural environment. We agree to
conduct environmental impact assessments for any and all
private and public development projects to ensure that additional
climate displacees are not created by development actions. We
further agree to engage in environmental impact assessments
prior to the start of any project and ensure that such assessments
are properly scoped. If it is determined through a state-enacted
environmental impact assessment that a development activity
effects more than one state, then the developing state agrees to
submit the development activity for consideration and approval
by all affected states prior to its initiation. If a dispute arises, the
member-states to this framework agree to submit matters to its
legal oversight body.
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This language accomplishes numerous objectives, the foremost being
that the member-states agree to cooperate with one another on climate
migration issues. This cooperation is put into perspective by including a
requirement that parties engage in environmental impact assessments for all
development activities. Based on the language of the Kampala Convention,
these assessments are designed to reduce or eliminate the potential for
development activities to create additional climate displacees. The proposed
language differs from the language in the Kampala Convention, in that it
accounts for how the difficulties inherent to one state’s development activities
affect other member-states. These effects are addressed by requiring that, if
an internal environmental impact assessment determines that a development
activity affects more than one state, the activity may be submitted for the other
affected states to consider and approve. This language is designed to limit
sovereignty concerns as it allows for states to conduct internal development if
there are no external impacts. Lastly, this proposed language accounts for
potential disputes arising from development, requires member-states to assess
environmental impacts, and asks member-states to first submit matters and
grievances to the previously proposed legal oversight body.
These operational principles provide recommendations that accompany
the proposed foundational principles. Creating a legally binding definition of
climate displacee, as well as a legal body that oversees the proposed ASEAN
climate migration framework, provide the agreement with a vital
enforceability mechanism. The migration tracking provision is similarly
important because it ensures that climate displacees are tracked when moving
and can help provide mitigation options to disaster-affected ASEAN states.
The requirement that states cooperate to reduce the number of climate
displacees and limit environmental harm while retaining national sovereignty
affirms the need for continued development despite a changing climate
spurred by anthropogenic change.
The combination of foundational and operational principles aims to
ensure that an ever-increasing number of climate displacees receive muchneeded protections. Once protected, it may be easier to incorporate these
persons into the societies of destination countries, rather than rely on
repatriation. This, in turn, will allow climate displacees to help improve the
economies of destination states, which may also generate social and cultural
benefits. 257 If climate displacees are not recognized, they may become
populations left behind by a destination state’s development.
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CONCLUSION
The need to create a legal definition of a climate displacee and develop
principles for their protection is part of the new reality of global governance.
Despite the importance of creating an ASEAN climate migration framework,
there may still be a lack of political will and a desire not to be bound by
additional international responsibilities. 258 This is worrying given how
climate change will impact ASEAN states, especially because such states are
uniquely positioned to be at the forefront of primary, secondary, and tertiary
climate change effects. Given this susceptibility, it is vital that ASEAN states
follow the lead of other regional entities such as the African Union and
demonstrate their understanding of climate change by considering this
article’s recommendations and developing the world’s first cross-border
regional climate migration framework.
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